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Abstract
We test a simple model of exchange rate regime choice with data for 65 non-OECD countries
covering the period 1980-94. We find that the variance of output at home and in potential target
countries as well as the correlation between home and foreign real activity are powerful and
robust predictors of exchange rate regime choice. Surprisingly, a more volatile foreign economy
can be an argument in favor of a fixed exchange rate regime once similarities in the business
cycle are taken into account. Comparable results hold for a variant of the model that focuses on
nominal rather than real determinants. We also look at the impact of “mistakes“ in exchange rate
regime choice on actual (nominal) exchange rate volatility. Countries that deviate from the model’s
predicted regime by choosing fixed instead of floating exchange rates generally suffer higher
exchange rate volatility than other countries having a fixed exchange rate regime. We also
investigate the role of such mistakes in within–sample episodes of current-account crises.
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Few questions in international economics have aroused more debate than the choice of the
proper exchange rate regime. Why have some developing countries adopted a (more or less)
fixed exchange rate regime, while others have opted for more flexible systems? And why do
countries change from one system to another? To be more specific: why did eighty-six
developing countries (out of 100 for which this information is available) have a fixed
exchange rate system in 1976, whereas in 1996 only forty-five (out of 123) had pegged their
currencies (IMF 1997, p. 79)? The debate was fueled by the Asian crisis which is often
interpreted as evidence against pegging.
1 However, this conclusion may be premature. The
proper question to ask is not whether pegging as such is a wrong policy but whether the
countries that pegged their currencies made the right choice.
In their recent survey on exchange rate systems Edwards and Savastano (1999) refer to
various studies that explain the downward trend in the number of pegging countries, arguing
that a flexible exchange rate system has advantages from a political-economy point of view.
The switch to more flexible systems lowers the political costs of exchange rate changes.
2
Although we take political-economy considerations into account in our empirical analysis, the
present paper focuses on the possibly diminishing economic advantages of a peg. Our simple
theoretical model integrates the advantages of flexible and fixed exchange rates. It fits in with
the modern literature on exchange rate regimes that emphasizes tradeoffs between credibility
and flexibility.
3 In this literature it is stressed that a flexible regime allows a country to have
an independent monetary policy, providing the flexibility to accommodate domestic and
foreign shocks. A fixed exchange rate regime reduces the degree of flexibility but imparts a
higher degree of credibility (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988). In contrast to most previous studies,
our model suggests that a more volatile foreign economy can be an argument in favor of a
fixed exchange rate regime once similarities in the business cycles in both countries are taken
into account.
4 The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Under fixed exchange rates,
the pegging country not only loses the ability to stabilize domestic shocks, but it will also
                                                         
1 Williamson (1998) dissents from the “newly emerging consensus on the gains that developing countries will
reap from moving toward ‘more flexible’ exchange rate regimes” (Edwards and Savastano (1999), p. 19).
2 See, for instance, Aghevli et al. (1991), Collins (1996), Edwards (1996), Blomberg and Hess (1997) and Klein
and Marion (1997). There is another line of research analyzing the economic consequences of the regime choice.
A good example of this literature is Ghosh et al. (1997). Edwards and Savastano (1999) provide a survey.
3 See, for instance, Frankel (1995) and Edwards (1996). Our analysis differs as we pay specific attention to the
volatility of output in both the home country and the foreign country as well as to the correlation between the
home country’s and the foreign country’s output shocks. A very different argument has been put forward by
Tornell and Velasco (1995) who argue that an exchange rate regime can be thought of as a mechanism to
allocate intertemporally the burden of the inflation tax.
4 Collins (1996) summarizes previous literature on the choice of the exchange rate regime as follows: “countries
which experience large foreign shocks should choose flexible exchange rates” (p. 118).2
import monetary policy of the country to which it pegs. For a sufficiently large and positive
correlation of shocks, a higher level of foreign output variance will support the choice of a
fixed exchange rate regime because now foreign monetary policy is, in principle, targeting the
same real shocks that haunt the home economy. Another implication of the model is that a
low level of central bank independence in the pegging country also increases the advantages
of pegging. Our empirical results based on panel data for 65 non-OECD countries covering
the period 1980-94 support our theoretical model quite well. The variance of output growth at
home and in potential target countries as well as the correlation between home and foreign
real activity, and the level of central bank independence in the pegging country are powerful
and robust predictors of exchange rate regime choice.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model
to analyze the choice of an exchange rate system. Section 3 contains the results of the
empirical counterpart of our theoretical model. The model of exchange rate regime choice
developed in Section 2 and empirically put to the test in Section 3 is based on long-term
determinants. An interesting question is whether countries that chose to peg their exchange
rate even though the estimated model predicts a floating exchange rate regime suffered from
higher actual exchange rate volatility than others. This issue is analyzed in Section 4. We find
that mistakes in institutional choice indeed matter for the actual behavior of exchange rates.
The final section offers some concluding comments.
2.“To Peg or Not to Peg?” – A Simple Theoretical Model
Berger et al. (1998) present a simple model that sheds some light on the determinants of a
government’s decision to peg or not to peg. The model abstracts from political-economic
arguments and assumes that governments choose between exchange rate regimes in order to
maximize a social welfare function.
5 Consider a small open economy in which log of output is
given by a conventional Lucas supply curve
(1)  ( ) e + p - p a =
e y ,
with 0 > a  being a parameter and p and 
e p denoting actual and expected inflation. The last
term is the home country’s output shock with 0 ) ( = e E and variance
2
e s . Inflation is interpreted
as the monetary authority’s policy instrument. Expectations are formed at the beginning of the
                                                         
5 We will, however, address some political economic aspects in the empirical part of the paper. In what follows,
we present an abbreviated and slightly altered version of their model.3
period, that is, before the output shock is realized, while policy is determined after the shock.
The model’s demand side is given by a stochastic purchasing power parity condition of the
form
(2)  F e p + = p ,
where e is the change in the nominal exchange rate and F p  is the foreign rate of inflation
controlled by the foreign country’s central bank. If the foreign central bank follows a standard
monetary policy program, foreign inflation will consist of a constant inflationary bias and a




* > p is the inflationary bias and  0 > b  is a constant. The random variable q represents
the foreign country’s output shock with 0 ) ( = q E and variance 
2
q s .
6 To simplify, we set  1 = b .
Substituting for F p , (2) thus becomes
(2’)  q - p + = p
* e .
Note that e will perfectly compensate both changes in 
* p and q when unconstrained, leaving
the home country’s monetary authority free to set inflation. Fixing the nominal exchange rate,
i.e. setting e = 0, however, will render national monetary policy endogenous.
Under floating exchange rates, monetary authority is delegated to the home country’s
central bank that acts to minimize expected deviations of output and inflation from their target
levels set to 
* y > 0 and  0
* = p , respectively,
(3)  ( ) { }
2 2 * p + - l = y y E ELCB ,
where l is the weight that the central bank puts on the real target. Taking into account (1) and















                                                         
6 Note that a more conservative and/or independent foreign central bank implies a lower 
* p and a lower b. See
Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (1998) for a discussion of the tradeoff between independence and conservativeness.4
If the government evaluated the central bank’s policy with a loss function similar to
(3) but for a higher weight on the real target,  l > l , expected government welfare under a
floating regime would be
(6) ( )














+ la + l = y y ELFL ,
where the first term measures the loss from the equilibrium output being too low, the second
term marks the loss from the inflationary bias, and the third and fourth terms denote losses
from output and inflation volatility due to e.
Under fixed exchange rates (2’) reduces to
(7) q - p = p
* ,
with
* p = p
e . Since (7) effectively determines actual inflation in the pegging country,
monetary policy is now “imported” or set abroad. As a consequence, equilibrium output under
rational expectations becomes a function of both the pegging country’s output shock and the
foreign output shock:
(8)  aq - e = y .




2 2 2 2 * 2 * 2 q q e q e q e s + s s ar - s a + s l + p + l = y ELFIX ,
where  q e r ,  is the coefficient of correlation between e and q. The terms in (9) mark the losses
arising from low output, imported average inflation, output volatility and inflation volatility,
respectively.
Fixing the exchange rate is advantageous from the government’s perspective if the
expected welfare loss under the pegging regime is smaller than under the floating regime, that
is if Fix Fl EL EL > . Using (6) and (9) and re-arranging yields the following inequality condition
for the pegging regime to be favored over the floating regime:
(10) q e q e q e s s r - s + s > p - p ,
2 2 2 * 2 ~ c b a ,
with  ( )
( )
0 2   and , 0 1 , 0
1
2
, 0 ~ 2
2 2
2
2 * > a l = > a l + = >
la +
l - la + l
la = > la = p c b a y .
A number of hypotheses on possible determinants of exchange rate choice can be drawn from
this simple model.5
(i) Credibility: A benevolent government should be more inclined to choose a pegging regime
if ceteris paribus the pegging country’s inflationary bias is high relative to the inflationary
bias of the foreign country [LHS of (10)]. This is the possible credibility gain stemming from
pegging to a stable foreign currency. Note that the home country’s inflationary bias would be
lower if monetary policy were delegated to an independent and conservative central banker.
Therefore the credibility gain is a decreasing function of the independence and conservatism
of the pegging country’s central bank.
7
(ii) Volatility: Whether pegging will be less or more attractive if ceteris paribus the variances
of the home country’s or the foreign country’s output shock are increasing [first and second
expression on the RHS of (10)] depends on the correlation of both shocks and the model’s
parameters. If  q e r , < 0, higher volatility at home or abroad will work against a fixed exchange
rate regime. The intuition is that under fixed exchange rates the pegging country not only
loses the ability to stabilize domestic shocks. In addition, it will also import a monetary policy
that reinforces rather than compensates such shocks (see eq. (8)). For a sufficiently large and
positive  q e r , , however, a higher  e s  or  q s  will support the choice of a fixed exchange rate
regime because now foreign monetary policy is, in principle, targeting the same real shocks
that haunt the home economy.
8 This is a possible stabilization gain (flexibility) associated
with a fixed exchange rate regime identified by Berger et al. (1998).
(iii) Correlation: Imported stabilization is also behind the conjecture that fixed exchange rates
are more advantageous if ceteris paribus the correlation between the home country’s and the
foreign country’s output shocks is ‘large’ in the sense that q e r , is positive and high or q e r , is
negative and small in absolute terms (last term RHS of (10)).
In Section 3 we will develop and test an empirical model incorporating these (as well
as other) determinants of exchange rate regime choice.
                                                         
7 A decrease in l will lower the attractiveness of a pegging regime if 
2 *) ( 2 / y a a l < l ¶ ¶ , which will always be
fulfilled as long as the initial degree of conservatism and independence of the central bank is sufficiently low. In
this case the LHS of the inequality will always decrease by more than the RHS as l is lowered. The reason is
that, similar to Rogoff’s (1985) argument relating to a conservative and independent central bank , the welfare
gains from a lower inflationary bias outweigh the losses from higher output volatility. This net-gain under the
floating regime hurts the case for fixed exchange rates.
8 That both variances might work in that direction is because both increase the covariance of e and q. The
necessary conditions are  b a/ 2 / , ￿ s s > r q e q e  for  e s and  c b/ 2 / , ￿ s s > r e q q e  for  q s .6
3. The Empirical Model of Exchange Rate Regime Choice
There are, in principle, two concepts to classify exchange rate regimes. A country’s
institutional or legal exchange rate framework is captured by the data collected by the IMF.
The IMF regularly compiles data about exchange rate regimes based on the information
provided by its members and the IMF’s own evaluation. Alternatively, a country’s exchange
rate regime could be evaluated by looking at actual or de-facto exchange rate behavior. The
latter variant has the advantage of being independent of government self-declarations. But it
produces rather noisy data that makes it hard to pinpoint institutional decisions based on
longer-run fundamentals as described in the previous section’s model. Consequently, in what
follows we will focus on the institutional measure of exchange rate regime choice captured in
the IMF data (see also Collins, 1996 and Edwards, 1996). We will, however, relate
institutional and actual behavior of exchange rates when we look at the impact of “mistakes”
in institutional choice on exchange rate volatility in Section 4.
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Notes: See the Appendix for the source. Displayed are the
number of countries from our sample of 65 with a fixed
exchange rate regime (PEGIMF = 1) from 1980 to 1994.
The variable of interest in the present section is PEGIMF. The variable is set to one if
a country has fixed its exchange rate against either a single currency such as the US-dollar or
a fixed-weight basket of currencies such as the  IMF’s special drawing rights (SDR).
Alternatively, if a country’s currency is floating or semi-floating according to its IFS/IMF
classification, PEGIMF takes on a value of zero. For instance, Argentina’s new currency
board arrangement is defined as a fixed exchange rate regime while its pre-1992 exchange7
rate regime was a float. While the index reduces the originally eight categories of exchange
rate regimes in the IMF data to just two, it still has considerable variance.
9
For the 65 non-OECD countries in our sample between 1980 and 1994 we have about
900 observations on PEGIMF of which 53 percent (47 percent) fall into the fixed (floating)
exchange rate category. Figure 1 reveals that there is a more or less complete reversal of the
ratio of fixed regimes to floating regimes. Between the early 1980s and the mid 1990s this
ratio changed from about 2:1 to 1:2 as the overall number of countries with a fixed exchange
rate fell. Despite the overall trend visible in Figure 1, a number of countries have gone back
and forth between both regimes. The question is whether this variance can be explained by the
model discussed above.
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MEANCORGDP MEANVARGDPH MEANVARGDPT
Notes: See text and the Appendix for a description of the data.
Displayed are the cross-country sample means of the respective
variables from 1980 to 1994.
Figure 2 displays the time paths of the sample mean of three of the explanatory
variables suggested in Section 3. VARGDPH measures the variance of shocks to real GDP
growth in a country in the ten years preceding a particular observation. The series captures the
role of 
2
e s  in equation (10). VARGDPT (i.e. 
2
q s ) captures the same information for the
possible target area a country might decide to fix its currency against. CORGDP (i.e.  q e r , )
measures the correlation between shocks to real GDP growth in the home country and the
                                                         
9 We have also experimented with a somewhat broader definition of our dummy variable but this did not change8
target area.
10 We give a more detailed description of the construction of these series in the
Appendix. What we can learn from a casual inspection of Figure 2 is that the dynamics of
these sample means have some but not a clear-cut relation to the dynamics in the number of
countries choosing a fixed exchange rate (see Figure 1). For instance, the average correlation
of real GDP shocks seems to be declining broadly in line with the drop in the number of
pegging regimes only until the mid-1980s. To uncover the actual relationship between the
institutional exchange rate regime choice both across time and across countries we need to
estimate a more fully fledged econometric model.
Before we can proceed to describing the model, however, another data related issue
needs to be addressed. In order to construct the variables VARGDPT and CORGDP we have
to define a possible target area for the home country to peg its exchange rate to. Allocating a
target area is quite straightforward if a country continuously fixed its currency via-à-vis a
single other currency such as the US-dollar or a weighted average of currencies such as the
SDR. In the latter case shocks are computed from the weighted average of the target area’s
real GDP where the weights are the ones used in the currency basket. Countries that
predominantly but not always pegged to a certain currency or group of basket of currencies
are treated similarly. In those cases in which countries pegged to varying areas or did not peg
at all during the sample period, we have chosen as possible target areas either the SDR
countries or the US depending on regional proximity and economic considerations.
11 For
those countries pegging to an unknown basket of currencies, we opt to construct a composite
exchange rate based on the relative shares of the three to six countries with whom they trade
the most. Table A1 in the Appendix identifies all computed or historically given target areas
for every country in the sample.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
most of our main results.
10 Note that equation (10) suggests that we use the covariance rather than the coefficient of correlation. Results
hardly change when we do. However, to minimize interaction between our right-hand side variables, we only
present results for  q e r , .
11 See Table A1 in the Appendix for details. We also experimented with alternative specifications. We found the
results robust with regard to such variations.9
Table 1: Estimation results (dependent variable is PEGIMF; probit model with GDP shocks)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5a) (5b) (6) (7)
Constant -0.704** 15.583** 38.526** 20.126** 22.500** 44.830** 12.811+ 34.741**
-3.308 2.726 6.217 3.274 4.055 5.193 1.921 3.670
VARGDPH 0.746* 0.922** 0.751* 0.803* 0.291 0.638 0.580 0.556
2.520 2.763 1.993 2.308 0.856 1.355 1.435 0.665
VARGDPT 1.150** 1.340** 2.349** 2.032** 1.886** 1.791** 2.895** 2.307**
4.862 4.499 8.261 4.900 5.926 6.192 5.684 4.670
CORGDP 0.252 1.162** 1.183** 0.961** 0.982** -0.147 1.184** 0.324
1.198 4.025 4.131 2.747 2.593 -0.490 3.339 0.810
TORAVG 0.882* 2.605** 0.976 2.761** 0.018 2.382** 2.494* 3.659**
2.113 4.065 1.154 4.366 0.025 2.599 2.099 2.880
INSTAVG -0.160 -0.433** -0.058 -0.295** -0.360** -0.205 -0.702**
-1.507 -3.960 -0.600 -2.990 -2.915 -1.507 -3.727
LPOPAVG -6.304** -13.713** -8.062** -8.188** -16.544** -5.217* -12.180**
-3.099 -6.236 -3.619 -4.138 -5.283 -2.241 -3.668
BRIT 0.493+ 1.586** 0.683* 0.607+ 0.252 0.293 1.259**
1.845 3.632 2.131 1.800 0.582 0.990 2.823
SAFRICA 0.845** 0.448+ 1.963** 0.294 1.608* 0.990+ 1.041+









# obs 887 877 851 859 712 712 762 582
# countries 65 65 63 63 55 55 59 50
Rho 0.765** 0.731** 0.759** 0.777** 0.756** 0.757** 0.743** 0.791**
25.683 20.421 20.248 21.344 16.670 15.435 15.842 20.560
% correct 0.657 0.686 0.696 0.659 0.691 0.692 0.688 0.773
** Significant at a 1 percent level. * Significant at a 5 percent level + Significant at a 10 percent level
Notes: Rho is the correlation between the individual effects residual and the remainder stochastic disturbance
(Rho = s(u)^2 / [s(u)^2 + s(v)^2]). In case it is insignificant the data may is not consistent with the random
effects model, i.e. there may be no discernible evidence of random effects in our data.
Table 1 presents the results of random effects  probit model with PEGIMF as the
endogenous variable. In column (1) we regress PEGIMF on a constant, VARGDPH,
VARGDPT, CORGDP, and TORAVG.
12 The model is based on 887 observations from 65
                                                         
12 Note that we do not include a variable that measures the inflationary bias of the target countries. The reason is
that we did not want to mix legal and non-legal measures of central bank independence (see below). Also, the
majority of possible target areas consists of industrial countries, namely the US, UK, Germany, and France.
Their respective central banks have – relative to most countries in our sample – a comparably high degree of
independence that hardly varies over time. Therefore indices of central bank independence in non-OECD
countries may well be interpreted as measures of the size of the relative  credibility gain associated with a
pegging regime.10
countries. TORAVG is the 1980-94 average of the turnover rate of central bank governors.
13
The long-term average of the turnover rate measures the degree of dependence of the home
country’s central bank from the government. Inferring from Section 2 we would expect
TORAVG to have a positive impact on the probability of a country to chose a fixed exchange
rate regime because a currency peg might serve as a substitute for an independent and
conservative central bank.
14 CORGDP should have a positive effect on PEGIMF too, since
more synchronized business cycles between the possible target area and the home country will
bring imported monetary policy more in line with the needs of the pegging country. For
VARGDPH and VARGDPT, the variance of shocks to GDP growth at home and abroad, our
priors are less clear. However, Figure 2 suggests that on average CORGDP has been positive.
This at least points towards a positive impact of both variables on the likelihood that a fixed
exchange rate regime is chosen.
We find the results to be in line with these predictions. The model correctly predicts
more than 65 percent of observations on exchange rate regimes. TORAVG has a positive and
significant impact (at the 5 percent level marked by “*”) on PEGIMF. The same holds for
VARGDPH. The effect of VARGDPT on the probability that a peg is chosen is positive as
well. Its impact is stronger than that of VARGDPH and significant even at the 1 percent level
(marked by “**”). While the correlation between real shocks in the home country and its
(possible) target area has the expected sign, it is only marginally significant in column (1).
Things change, however, once we introduce standard controls for some idiosyncratic country
characteristics. After controlling for political instability, population size, colonial heritage,
and regional effects in the model presented in column (2), CORGDP shows a strong positive
and significant (at the 1 percent level) influence of the probability that a country chooses a
fixed exchange rate regime.
15
As to the controls, INSTAVG, a time-invariant measure capturing a number of
dimensions of political instability, and LPOPAVG, the average population (in logs), exhibit a
significant negative influence on PEGIMF. It would seem that, quite intuitively, larger and
politically less stable nations tend towards more flexible exchange rate arrangements. BRIT, a
dummy variable that is 1 when a country was formerly a British colony, and SAFRICA, a
                                                         
13 The turnover rate (TOR) of central bank governors is widely used as a measure for central bank
(in)dependence in non-OECD countries (see Cukierman, 1992, Cukierman et al., 1992 and De Haan and Kooi,
2000). We employ an entirely new data set for the TOR. See the Appendix for further details.
14 Literally this is only correct if a central bank that becomes more independent from the government is also
more  conservative  than the government. See  Eijffinger and  Hoeberichts (1998) and Berger, De Haan and
Eijffinger (2000) for a discussion of the relation of central bank conservatism and independence.11
dummy marking Sub-Saharan African countries, both have a positive impact of the
probability of a peg and are at least significant at the 10 percent level (marked by “+”).
16 A
more detailed discussion of these control variables can be found in the Appendix. Adding this
set of four control variables does improve the percentage of correctly predicted observations
of PEGIMF, and marginally reduces the significance of including a country specific
disturbance term.
In columns (3) to (7) we extend the results of column (2) by introducing a number of
additional variables that, while not suggested by the simple theoretical model in Section 2, are
sometimes thought to influence exchange rate regime choice. One way to interpret this
exercise is as a robustness check: are the results of the basic model robust with regard to the
introduction of alternative explanatory variables? A quick glance at Table 1 shows that the
answer to this question is “yes”. For instance, adding openness (OPEN51) as suggested for
instance by Collins (1996) – defined as the lagged backward-looking moving five-year
average of the sum of exports and imports over GDP – does not alter the results of the basic
model by much (column (3)). The only change worth mentioning is that TORAVG turns
insignificant on conventional levels. It does, however, keep its positive sign and still has a t-
Statistic of about 1.2.
Openness itself has a negative influence on the probability of a country choosing a
fixed exchange rate regime in the model (significant at the 1 percent level).
17 Collins (1996)
argues that less open countries will have thinner markets for foreign exchange and that policy
makers in these countries will find it more difficult to manage a flexible exchange rate
system.
Another variable that might have an influence on exchange rate regime choice is real
growth. Indeed it could be argued that a pegging regime is less attractive in extended periods
of low or negative growth when loose monetary policy might promise some short-term relief
(see also Collins, 1996). Column (4) follows up on that notion by adding the variable
GROWTH51, the lagged backward-looking five-year moving average of real GDP growth of
the home country. However, this variable has no significant explanatory power and leaves the
results for the basic model more or less unchanged.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
15 A previous study that also found some support for the view that domestic and foreign shocks influence a
country’s choice of exchange rate regime is Melvin (1985). However, this study does not take both variance and
correlation into account.
16 We experimented with a complete set of colonial and regional dummies, but found that only the ones used in
column (2) showed a consistent and statistically strong influence on PEGIMF. SAFRICA essentially captures the
CFA French franc zone. Additional results are available on request.12
Additional results concerning  total external debt are displayed in column (5b).
DEBTGDP1, one-year lagged external debt denominated in foreign currency in percent of
GDP, has a highly significant negative influence on a country’s propensity to peg. In other
words, highly indebted countries seem to prefer floating over fixed exchange rates. If some of
the external funds are channeled into the private sector, either directly or, for instance, via
state guarantees for bank-lending to firms, this result can be seen as supporting the banking-
view of currency crises put forward, for instance, by Mishkin (1999). The argument is that a
peg makes it more likely that foreign investors indulge in “excessive lending”, which, in turn,
will fuel a boom-and-bust cycle, eventually leading to a severe currency crisis. Since
countries with high amounts of foreign denominated debt suffer more from a sudden
devaluation of their currency, they should indeed be less inclined to opt for a fixed exchange
rate regime.
Note, however, that this result comes amidst serious collinearity between the external
debt variable and the correlation measure CORGDP. With the introduction of external debt
the impact of CORGDP seems to disappear. A comparison of columns (5a) and (5b) shows
that this is due to the interaction of both variables rather than to the fact that using
DEBTGDP1 reduces the available sample size. In fact, CORGDP exhibits a strong negative
influence on DEBTGDP1 and that relation remains significant even when other possible
determinants of external debt are taken into account.
18 Therefore, perhaps an explanation of
what is going on in column (5b) is that the average decline in business cycle synchronicity,
which helped to explain the decline in the overall number of fixed exchange rate regimes, also
inspired an inflow of external funds. This conjecture is supported by the fact that average
growth rates (and real interest rates) in many of the so-called emerging market economies
were relatively high compared to the OECD countries during the sample period.
Another extension of the basic model worth exploring involves hard  currency
reserves. Column (6) presents the estimated coefficients with RESMON51, the lagged
backward-looking five-year moving average of international reserves in percent of base
money. As with openness and real growth, the basic model is robust with regard to the
additional variable. Somewhat surprisingly, however, reserves do not have a significantly
positive influence on the pegging decision. This is also true for a number of alternative data
specifications – for instance, using a reserves-to-GDP ratio does not provide significant
                                                                                                                                                                                    
17 Collins (1996) also found a negative effect of openness in her  probit model. We get similar results for
openness if we include it as a time-invariant long-run average rather than as a backward-looking moving
average. Alternative results available on request.13
results either. One explanation is that the legal or institutional exchange rate indicator
PEGIMF mirrors long-term or medium-term decisions on the exchange rate regime well
captured by our theoretically derived base model, while international reserves are a short-term
determinant of such decisions.
Finally, we have added dummy variables indicating whether some kind of capital
control restriction was in place.
19 Generally, the dummies had not a significant coefficient
(not shown).
20
While the various extensions of the base model raise its overall predictive power – the
comprehensive model presented in column (7) correctly predicts more than 77 percent of the
observed exchange rate regime choices in our sample –, the additional controls all but void
the quantitative impact of the base model. For instance, the quite strong positive impact that
foreign volatility and the central bank turnover rate have on the probability of a fixed
exchange rate occurring are increasing when we move from column (1) to (7). Evaluated at
sample means, the estimated  elasticities for VARGDPH, VARGDPT, and TOR are,
respectively, 0.14, 0.24, and 0.18 in column (1) and 0.06, 0.34, and 0.46 in column (7). The
influence of business cycle synchronicity is quite stable across models: a one percent increase
in CORGDP increases the probability that a fixed exchange rate regime is chosen by about
0.035 percent both in columns (1) and (7). The figure is only seemingly small. To put it into
perspective, remember that, on average, countries in our sample were confronted with a
decline in CORGDP by about 50 percent between 1980 and 1994 (see Figure 2).
Before we turn to the analysis of actual exchange rate behavior, however, we briefly
discuss another robustness check of our main findings. Table 2 presents results from models
mirroring those in Table 1 except for the fact that the variance and correlation variables are
inflation-based and not real GDP-based. Behind this exercise lies the question of whether the
standard model of monetary policy, which is at the core of the theoretical model in Section 2,
is indeed a good approximation of reality. The model predicts a linear relation between real
and nominal shocks both in the target area and in the home country.
21 But what if there were,
                                                                                                                                                                                    
18 For instance, if we use an OLS model similar in structure to column (2) to explain DEBTGDP we find the
coefficient for CORGDP to be a negative and significant at the 1 percent level.
19 We have employed four dummies, indicating multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current account
transactions, restrictions on capital account transactions and surrender of export proceeds, respectively. The data
were kindly provided by Gian Maria Milessi-Ferretti.
20 These findings contrast somewhat with those of Edwards (1996) who found that restrictions on capital account
transactions entered significantly.
21 More specifically, from the model in Section 2 it follows that 
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for instance, non-additive control errors involved in monetary policy that would distort these
relations? In this case a prudent test of the hypotheses developed in Section 2 should indeed
rely on inflation-based rather than on output-based variables.
Table 2: Estimation results (dependent variable is PEGIMF; probit model with inflation shocks)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant 0.143 18.645** 58.561** 8.432+ 25.174** 5.569 32.905**
0.730 4.435 8.478 1.646 3.760 1.029 3.567
VARDCPIH -1.613 -2.518 -10.460 -6.305+ -0.807 8.242 -0.201
-0.418 -0.757 -1.462 -1.720 -0.185 1.381 -0.013
VARDCPIT 1.014** 1.051** 0.552** 0.894** 1.180** 0.941** 1.281**
8.190 6.690 3.948 6.167 8.407 6.605 3.997
CORDCPI 0.924** 1.147** 1.208** 1.056** 1.045** 1.493** 1.259**
8.751 9.329 9.707 7.548 6.154 7.086 3.359
TORAVG -0.828* 2.397** 3.072** 2.316** -0.199 3.618** 0.956
-2.324 3.151 5.390 3.359 -0.231 5.355 0.920
INSTAVG -0.578** -0.459** -0.646** -0.183 -0.427** -0.428*
-6.444 -4.867 -6.369 -1.626 -4.007 -1.990
LPOPAVG -7.198** -21.232** -3.370+ -9.268** -2.666 -11.592**
-4.827 -8.650 -1.893 -3.885 -1.378 -3.565
BRIT 0.252 1.136** 1.174** 0.635 0.567* 1.539*
0.913 4.165 4.037 1.591 2.197 2.252
SAFRICA 0.639* 2.947** 0.431 1.663** 0.729+ 2.331**









# obs 850 850 827 834 692 741 597
# countries 65 65 63 63 55 59 50
Rho 0.791** 0.805** 0.831** 0.855** 0.720** 0.799** 0.853**
33.677 25.423 28.608 37.488 15.308 21.199 19.586
% correct 0.560 0.665 0.690 0.616 0.697 0.665 0.705
** Significant at a 1 percent level. * Significant at a 5 percent level + Significant at a 10 percent level
Notes: Rho is the correlation between the individual effects residual and the remainder stochastic disturbance
(Rho = s(u)^2 / [s(u)^2 + s(v)^2]). In case it is insignificant the data may is not consistent with the random
effects model, i.e. there may be no discernible evidence of random effects in our data.
In the light of these considerations, it is re-assuring that the results listed in Table 2 are
very much in line with those in Table 1. Again we find that a more volatile foreign economy
(VARDCPIT – see the Appendix for details) as well as a higher synchronicity of business
cycles (CORDCPI) has a significantly positive influence on the probability that a fixed
exchange rate is chosen. However, the influence of a more volatile home economy
(VARDCPIH) on the pegging decision is less clear in Table 2 than in Table 1. In most
columns the variable is not significantly different from zero. A lower degree of central bank15
independence (i.e. a high TORAVG) remains significantly positively related to PEGIMF
except for column (1) where the controls for idiosyncratic country characteristics are
excluded. As for the extensions, we find again that openness and external debt have a
significantly negative effect on the likelihood of a fixed exchange rate regime being chosen.
Interestingly, the interaction between CORDCPI and DEBTGDP1 does not lead to a
insignificant coefficient for the correlation measure in Table 2. We also find that, in contrast
to Table 1, in Table 2 international reserves (RESMON51) have a statistically significant
negative impact on PEGIMF. The dummy variables for the existence of capital controls had
(again) no significant effect  (not shown). The quantitative impact of the base model presented
in Table 2 are broadly comparable with the results in Table 1, too. A notable exception is the
somewhat bigger role that CORCPI plays compared to CORGDP. Evaluated at sample means,
a one percent increase in CORCPI increases the probability of choosing a fixed exchange rate
regime by about 15 percent in column (1) and 18 percent in column (7) of Table 2. All in all,
however, the main message of Table 2 is that the results concerning the basic model are very
much comparable with the findings presented above.
A final issue is the possible endogeneity of our right-hand-side variables. It certainly
helps that our empirical exercise is theory-based. For instance, foreign business cycle
volatility, a variable suggested by the theoretical model in Section 2, is independent from the
home country’s chosen exchange rate regime. In addition, we do not include home inflation
but rather its determinant, actual central bank independence as measured by the turnover
rate.
22 In order to limit the remaining simultaneity issues, we introduce all right-hand-side
variables either as backward-looking or time-invariant (see above). The notion that this
procedure effectively minimizes possible repercussions between PEGIMF and its
determinants is supported by the fact that our basic results do not change when we confine our
sample to countries that actually changed their exchange rate regime at some point.
23
4. Do (Wrong) Exchange Rate Regimes Matter?
The model of exchange rate regime choice developed in Section 2 and empirically put to test
in Section 3 is based on long-term determinants. For instance, we estimate the impact of
backward-looking averages of volatility or sample-averages of the turnover rate of central
                                                         
22 Gosh et al. (1997) in their comprehensive study on the effects of exchange rate regimes find the strongest
relation with inflation. Real growth, which enters our model as an additional control variable, is only weakly
connected with these institutional choices.
23 Additional results are available on request from the authors.16
bank governors on the probability that a fixed exchange rate regime is chosen. Moreover, the
exchange rate regime measure used is a bivariate institutional index of exchange rate regimes
rather than a variable based on actual exchange rate behavior. The question remains whether
such institutional choices matter for observed exchange rate movements. A particularly
interesting query is whether countries that chose to peg their exchange rate even though the
estimated model suggested a floating exchange rate suffered from higher actual exchange rate
volatility than others. After all, many observers of the recent Asian turmoil argue that fixed
exchange rates contributed to the currency and financial crises of the 1990s.
To answer this question we conduct a second series of regressions. Using OLS
random-effects techniques, we relate PEGSTD, the standard deviation of the percentage
changes of the nominal exchange rate within a year, to the residuals of the basic exchange rate
regime choice model described in columns (2) of Tables 1 and 2 above. The exchange rates
are defined vis-à-vis the possible target areas identified in the previous section (see the
Appendix). The left panel reports the results for the residuals stemming from the GDP-based
model, the right panel reports those of the inflation-based model.
Take the case of countries with an institutionally fixed exchange rate (PEGIMF = 1) first.
Here a high residual in the base model suggests that the country chose a pegging regime
despite the fact that our model suggested a floating exchange rate in that particular year.
Consequently, we should also expect a positive correlation between the standard deviation of
actual exchange rate growth and the residuals stemming from the base model. The reason is
that a country with a fixed exchange rate regime that is in line the with the suggestions of the
base model is simply less likely to deviate from the fixed exchange rate. Consequently it is
also less likely to produce a non-zero standard deviation of actual exchange rates than a
country with high residuals. In other words, the residuals from the base model multiplied by
PEGIMF should have a positive and significant impact on PEGSTD. It is less clear, however,
what we should expect in the case of countries that chose a floating exchange rate
(PEGIMF = 0). Since we cannot infer from the institutional choice of the exchange rate
regime on possible realizations of PEGSTD as in the first case, we also lack a prior with
regard to the possible impact of the residuals from the base model on actual exchange rate
volatility.
24
                                                         
24 Such a hypothesis would demand a more explicit model of actual exchange rate behavior.17
Table 3: Impact of policy choice on actual volatility of exchange rate (dependent variable: PEGSTD; OLS random effects)
GDP-based model Inflation-based model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.031** 0.031** 0.022** 0.042** 0.003 0.005 0.033** 0.033** 0.024** 0.044** 0.006** 0.008
6.922 6.981 4.125 9.575 0.680 0.834 7.735 7.688 4.662 10.355 1.242 1.386
RES (2)
PEGRES (2) 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.007* 0.008* 0.007* 0.008** 0.009** 0.008** 0.007* 0.007* 0.007*
2.289 2.095 2.236 2.108 2.387 2.284 2.777 2.712 2.631 2.442 2.482 2.533
NOPEGRES (2) -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.007*
-0.372 -0.563 -0.423 -0.458 0.532 1.302 0.891 0.938 0.641 0.584 1.370 2.159
INST5 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004+
0.516 -1.187 -0.341 -1.859
TOR5 0.032** 0.030** 0.031** 0.029**
2.837 2.700 2.716 2.687
GROWTH -0.354** -0.296** -0.351** -0.296**
-6.820 -5.326 -6.762 -5.356
DEBTGDP 0.044** 0.040** 0.043** 0.039**
10.697 10.130 10.698 10.176
# obs. 877 867 877 872 759 744 877 867 877 872 759 744
Adj. R2 0.004 0.003 0.013 0.054 0.134 0.181 0.007 0.006 0.014 0.055 0.137 0.186
Hausman test 0.996 1.087 2.004 1.777 2.844 6.862 1.612 1.792 2.659 1.609 3.235 4.823
F-test 3.000** 2.886** 2.646** 2.627** 1.980** 1.556** 2.923** 2.883** 2.577** 2.572** 1.917** 1.508*
** Significant at a 1 percent level. * Significant at a 5 percent level + Significant at a 10 percent level
Notes: Hausman test compares fixed- and random-effects model. In case the Chi-square statistic is significantly different from zero, the fixed-effects model should be preferred.
F-test compares random-effects model with a model only including a constant. In case the F-test statistic is significantly different from zero, the random-effects model should be
preferred.18
Columns (1) in Table 3 provide the results of a regression of PEGSTD on the residuals
of the base model based on real GDP growth and inflation (see columns (2) of Tables 1 and 2)
both for institutionally pegging and floating countries. The former are represented by
PEGRES, the latter by NOPEGRES. We find that indeed the standard deviation of actual
exchange rates significantly increases (at the 5 percent level) under a regime with
institutionally fixed exchange rates when the residuals stemming from the base model are
higher. Following the interpretation introduced above, this seems to suggest that  pegging
regimes that are in line with the fundamentals identified in the theoretical model in Section 2
have less variability of their currencies. There is no significant relation between the residuals
of the base model and PEGSTD for floating exchange rate regimes in Table 3. This result (as
well as all other findings presented in Table 3) are quite similar whether we use inflation-
based or GDP-based residuals from the exchange rate regime choice model.
In order to test the robustness of the result concerning PEGRES, columns (2) to (6)
report results for various extensions of the model. INST5 is the five-year backward-looking
averages of our political instability measure and TOR5 is the five-year backward-looking sum
of the central banker  turnover rate  already introduced (see the Appendix for details).
However, only TOR5 is significantly related to PEGSTD. It would seem that an increase in
the turnover rate but not in political instability is significantly positive correlated with an
increase in exchange rate volatility. Interpreted literally, this result suggests that a more
independent central bank (i.e. one with a lower turnover rate) might be instrumental in
keeping exchange rate volatility down. There is, however, an issue of reversed causality here
to which we will return. Note that neither the inclusion of INST5 nor that of TOR5 in the
model alters results for PEGRES.
Interestingly, a high contemporaneous level of external debt over GDP (DEBTGDP)
has a significantly positive impact on PEGSTD. This suggests that the arguments put forward
by the banking-view of currency crises (see Section 3) not only influence the institutional
exchange rate regime choice but also actual exchange rate behavior. We also find that higher
contemporaneous real growth  (GROWTH) has a highly significant negative influence on
within-year exchange rate volatility. As one would expect, lower growth rates will lead to
more volatile actual exchange rates. Again, the results concerning PEGRES do not change
with the inclusion of these additional variables.
A natural question with regard to the results in Table 3 is to the possibility of reversed
causality. Of course, we can imagine a strong devaluation of a pegged currency to have19
contemporaneous repercussions on, for instance, political instability or growth. In order to
follow up on this notion we repeated all regressions with the additional right-hand side
variables lagged one period. Quite reassuringly, we find all results but the one for the central
bank turnover rate more or less unchanged. While TOR51 (see the Appendix) still exhibits a
positive influence on PEGSTD, its level of significance drops below conventional levels. One
way to interpret this is indeed that causality runs from PEGSTD to TOR5: it is currency
turmoil that increases the turnover rate of central bank governors and not vice versa.
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We conclude that there is a significant impact of “mistakes” in exchange rate regime
choice on actual (nominal) exchange rate volatility no matter whether other possible
determinants are controlled for. As a rule, countries that deviate from the model’s predicted
regime choice by choosing fixed instead of floating exchange rates generally suffer higher
exchange rate volatility.  How strong is the effect in economic terms? The coefficients
reported in columns (6) of Table 3 already indicate that, compared, for instance, to the impact
of GROWTH and DEBTGDP, the effect of a one percent increase in PEGRES is relatively
small. Still, the influence is not negligible. Take the GDP-based model reported in the left
panel of Table 3. The elasticity of PEGSTD with regard to PEGRES is about 0.04. Evaluated
at sample means, a one standard deviation increase in PEGRES would have increased
PEGSTD by 0.0073 or about 1/10 standard deviations.
Another way to evaluate the consequences of exchange rate regime choice is to ask
what does the model of exchange rate regime choice have to say about recent examples of
balance-of-payments crises? Table 4 reports some statistics on the behavior of actual
exchange rates to that end. As before, the standard deviation of exchange rates is computed
from the monthly growth rate of nominal exchange rates within a given year. We find that,
based on our entire sample of 893 observations across countries and years, the standard
deviation associated with fixed exchange rate regimes is only marginally lower than in the
overall sample. One explanation commonly given is that fixed exchange rate regimes are just
as prone to suffer sudden dramatic bursts of re-valuations than floating regimes (Caramazza
and Azis, 1998). According to Table 4, however, this is only part of the story. Another part is
institutional mistakes.
In line with the regression results in Section 4, the last column of Table 4 shows that
those fixed exchange rate regimes in line with our base model during 1980-94 had less
                                                         
25 Other results point at a negative interaction of the level (or change) of international reserves with observed
exchange rate volatility. The variable has at least a marginally significant influence on PEGRES. Not
surprisingly, a higher level of reserves makes actual exchange rates less volatile under a pegging regime.20
volatile actual exchange rates. So primarily countries that selected a fixed exchange rate
regime which is  not in line with fundamentals are haunted by sudden exchange rate
volatility.
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During entire period 1980-94
Std. 0.031 0.030 0.027
Obs. 893 475 339
During balance-of-payment crises
Std. 0.116 0.124 0.057
Obs. 29 6 1
During banking crises
Std. 0.038 0.005 0.007
Obs. 17 3 2
Notes: Definition of balance-of-payments crises and banking crises from
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999, data appendix). Standard deviation as defined
in the Appendix. Observations are countries * years. We get qualitative
similar results if we use the standard deviation of nominal exchange rate
levels from their trend instead.
This is also true during times of balance-of-payments crises. The middle panel of Table 4
reveals that of the 29 observations of exchange rate volatility within our sample that are
identified by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) as falling into a balance-of-payments crises, only
six occurred under a pegging regime. It is interesting to note that the standard deviation of
exchange rates under fixed regimes is somewhat but not dramatically higher than under
floating rates. Note, however, that the one fixed exchange rate regime that was in line with the
model’s recommendation suffered a significantly less volatile exchange rate. Again it would
seem that it is wrongly fixed exchange rates rather than regimes of fixed exchange rates per se
that are linked to bursts of actual forex market volatility.
During banking crises the behavior of exchange rates hardly differs between regimes
supported or not supported by the model (lower panel in Table 4). This is line with Kaminsky
and  Reinhart’s (1999) results that such crises predate rather than accompany balance-of-
payments crises.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
However, since the reversed causality issue is probably most virulent here, we do not report these additional
results.
26 Note that the second column excludes those floating regimes for which the model suggests a fixed exchange
rate regime. Including those does increase the number of relevant observations to 483 and the average standard
deviation to 0.029.21
5. Concluding comments
Like most previous studies our theoretical model is based on two highly simplified cases: a
fully flexible exchange rate versus an irrevocably (and credibly) fixed nominal exchange rate.
Purely floating and fixed systems are, of course, only two possible options. Edwards and
Sevastano (1999) distinguish nine existing different exchange rate regimes, varying from free
float to full dollarization. Still, our theoretical model yields some very interesting insights that
have not been (fully) taken into account in most of the previous literature. It suggests, for
instance, that a more volatile foreign economy can be an argument in favor of a fixed
exchange rate regime once similarities in the business cycles in both countries are taken into
account. The model supports Frankel’s (1999) view that there are no general rules as to the
optimality of an exchange rate regime. Frankel argues that the decision to peg or not to peg
varies over time with the circumstances. Our theoretical model derives recommendations on
the choice of the exchange rate regime based on such characteristics in any given period. And
our empirical results suggest that these characteristics indeed matter.
Again, some caveats are in order here as some of the problems that plague the
literature on the consequences of exchange rate regimes may also have affected our results.
As pointed out by Edwards and Sevastano (1999) most studies classify studies following the
countries’ official description of the exchange rate (typically the one they report to the IMF).
However, differences between de jure and de facto regimes may be substantial. Furthermore,
it is assumed that the regimes were sustainable in the period under consideration and that
duration is assumed to be immaterial. We have taken the first issue into account by focusing
also on actual exchange rate stability. Furthermore, our results show that de jure choices are
not on paper only, as they matter for actual behavior. The second issue has only partly been
taken into account in that we analyze whether a ‘wrong’ policy choice has affected actual
exchange rate volatility. Our results suggest that mistakes in institutional choice indeed
matter: the standard deviation of the nominal exchange rate of countries that should –
according to our model – not have fixed their exchange rate is higher than that in countries
that made a choice in accordance with our model. In future research we plan to further explore
possible explanations of mistakes in institutional choice, especially focusing on political-
economic factors forcing (democratic and non-democratic) countries to peg or float when our
model yields different advice.22
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Appendix
Data Source
In the empirical analysis we concentrate on a large set of developing countries, covering the 1980-1994 period.
Unless mentioned otherwise all underlying data are from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. Series
names ending with ‘AVG’ mean that they are averages over the entire period. Those ending with ‘5’ are five-
year backward-looking moving averages. In order not to lose valuable observations, the underlying series for
these variables start in 1975. If a series name (also) ends with a ‘1’ it means that it is lagged one period. An
additional ‘D’ in front of a name indicates that first-differences over time are taken.
Official pegging strategy (PEGIMF) and actual or potential pegged-to-currency (TARGET)
The IMF classifies each country into different categories concerning their exchange rate regime. To construct
our dependent variable PEGIMF, we declare countries which peg to the US dollar, the French franc, the SDR, or
any other currency or composite as ‘pegging’ countries. Countries with a (semi-) flexible exchange rate we
consider to be non-pegging. For those countries pegging to an unknown basket of currencies we opt to construct
a composite exchange rate based on the relative shares of the three to six countries with whom they trade the
most. The trade data is taken from  IMF’s Trade Statistics. To determine to which countries non-pegging
countries would potentially peg, we look at their history. If they have never pegged we choose to use the US
dollar or the SDR as their potential target currencies. Table A1 shows all countries, the periods during which
they pegged or had a floating currency, and their (potential) target countries.
Standard deviation of percentage change in exchange rate (PEGSTD)
To construct an actual measure of exchange rate volatility we look at the yearly standard deviation of the
percentage change of the actual monthly exchange rate between the home and target country.
Variance real GDP/inflation shocks home (VARGDPH/VARDCPIH) and target countries
(VARGDPT/VARDCPIT) and the correlation between both real GDP/inflation shocks (CORGDP/CORDCPI)
To construct an empirical measure for the variance of the home and foreign countries output shocks we have
used the following procedure. For the home and foreign country we have calculated the real GDP growth rates
in, respectively local currency and US-dollar over the period 1971-1994. In case the home country (potentially)
pegs to a composite, the real GDP growth rate of the foreign country is computed by using a weighted average of
the underlying countries. For the SDRs the weights are 0.4, 0.21, 0.17, 0.11 and 0.11 for, respectively the United
States, Germany, Japan, France, and the United Kingdom. For other composites the weights are according to
their trade shares. For each ten-year period in which there are more than three observations available we apply
the Hodrick-Prescott technique to filter out the shocks in output growth (for both the home and foreign country).
The variance of these output shocks for the sample 1980-1989 are then, for instance, taken as a measure for the
variance of the output shock in the year 1990. We also calculated the correlation between the output shocks of
the home and foreign country over all these ten-year periods. This is our measure for the correlation between
both output shocks. A similar procedure is applied to construct an empirical measure for the variance of the
home and foreign countries inflationary shocks and their correlation. Our measure of inflation is the percentage
change in the consumer price index.
Central Bank Independence and the turnover rate (TORAVG, TOR5, TOR51)
As proxy for Central Bank Independence Campillo and Miron (1997) use  Cukierman’s (1992) legal index.
However, Cukierman argues that legal independence measures may be a better proxy for actual independence in
industrial countries than in developing countries.  Cukierman (1992) and  Cukierman et al. (1992) therefore
developed a yardstick for central bank autonomy which is not based on regulation but on the actual average term
of office of central bank governors in different countries. This indicator is based on the presumption that, at least
above some threshold, a higher turnover rate (TOR) of central bank governors indicates a lower level of
independence. Until recently, Cukierman’s TOR was the only such measure available. However, using three
sources of information, we have been able to construct a more extensive data set starting in 1975 including the
annual changes of the governor. The data sources (in the order that we have used them in constructing our data
set) are: information we received directly from various central banks, Pringle (1999) and the IMF’s International
Financial Statistics. As to the latter, generally, either the country's governor to the IMF or his alternate is the
governor of the central bank. In each monthly issue of the IFS the names of the governor to the IMF and his
alternate are shown, which makes it possible to infer whether the central bank has a new Chief Executive Officer. In
the empirical analysis we take both the average and the five-years backward-looking moving sum of this turnover
rate.25
Political instability (INSTAVG, INST5)
In order to capture the multi-dimensional aspects of political uncertainty or instability, we construct an index that
summarizes eight variables indicating  socio-political unrest. Those variables are the number of assassinations,
strikes, guerilla problems, government crises, purge, riots, revolutions, and anti-government demonstrations and are
taken from Siermann (1998). Here we employ the method of principal components. Principal components analysis
is a statistical technique that helps us to reduce the number of variables in an analysis by describing linear
combinations of the variables that contain most of the information, i.e. linear combinations with the greatest
variance.
In the initial analysis we also used data from the Barro-Lee data set (number of political assassinations, number of
military coups and revolutions, a dummy for countries that have been involved in war any time between 1960 and
1990), Knack and Keefer (1995) (political instability, and an index of civil liberties), and Barro (1996) (political
rights). As these variables are only available at a cross-section level averaging over a much longer period than used
in this analysis and were not available for as many countries as the data of Siermann (1998), we opted to use the
data of Siermann (1998) in the final analysis. Our conclusions are not influenced by this.
Average log population (LPOPAVG)
To have a measure for the size of a country we include the average logarithm of the population of the country.
Former British colonies (BRIT) and sub-Saharan African countries (SAFRICA)
To capture institutional differences we included dummies for former British colonies and sub-Saharan African
countries. We also tried dummies for former Spanish and French colonies and Latin-American countries, but
they were hardly ever significant and are therefore submitted from the final analysis.
Openness (OPENAVG, OPEN51)
Openness we measure in the usual way as the sum of total imports and exports as percentage of GDP.
Real GDP growth rate (GROWTH, GROWTH51)
Simply the growth rate of real GDP.
External debt as percentage of GDP (DEBTGDP1)
Total external debt is taken from the World Bank Development Indicators and is defined as debt owed to
nonresidents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services denominated in US dollars. Total external debt is
the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private non-guaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF credit, and short-
term debt. Short-term debt includes all debt having an original maturity of one year or less and interest in arrears
on long-term debt. Before calculating its share in GDP, we transformed GDP into US dollars by using the annual
exchange rate.
International reserves as percentage of the base money (RESMON51) and as percentage of GDP (RESGDP51)
First we transfer international reserves denominated in SDR’s into local currency by using the annual exchange rate
and the annual SDR/US dollar exchange rate. Then we scale it by using either the base money (M0) or nominal
GDP.
Capital restrictions CAPRES1-4: dummies, indicating multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current account
transactions, restrictions on capital account transactions and surrender of export proceeds, respectively.
Tables A2 and A3 summarize the above. The first gives all underlying series needed to construct the variables
shown in the latter. Table A4 shows some summary statistic of all variables used in the empirical analysis.26
Table A1: Summary of countries and their pegging decisions
Home country Target countries Pegging Floating
Argentina US 1992-1994 1980-1991
Bahamas US 1980-1994
Bahrain SDR 1980-1994
Bangladesh US, Japan, UK 1980-1981
US, Japan, Singapore 1982-1991
US, Japan, Hong Kong 1992-1994
Belize US 1983-1994
Botswana US 1980




Belgium, Germany, France 1993-1994
Chile US 1980-1982 1983-1994
Colombia US 1980-1994
Costa Rica US 1980-1982 1983-1994
Cyprus UK, France, Italy, Germany, Greece, Japan 1980-1994
Dominican Republic US 1980-1985, 1991 1986-1990, 1992-1994
Ecuador US 1980-1983, 1989 1984-1988, 1990-1994
Egypt US 1980-1987 1988-1994
El Salvador US 1980-1985, 1987-1990 1986, 1991-1994
Ethiopia US 1980-1993 1994
Fiji New Zealand, UK, Japan, Australia 1980-1994
Ghana US 1980-1985, 1987-1994 1986
Greece SDR 1980-1994
Guatemala US 1980-1990 1991-1994
Haiti US 1980-1991 1992-1994
Honduras US 1980-1990 1991-1994
India SDR 1980-1994
Indonesia SDR 1980-1994
Iran SDR 1981-1993 1980, 1994
Jamaica US 1980-1984 1985-1994
Jordan SDR 1980-1989
Iraq, US, India 1990-1991
Iraq, US, Germany 1992-1994
Kenya SDR 1980-1988
UK, Germany, Japan 1989-1992
UK, Germany, US 1993-1994
Korea South US 1980 1981-1994
Kuwait Japan, UK, Netherlands 1980-1981
Japan, Italy, US 1982, 1984
Japan, Italy, Netherlands 1983
Japan, US, Netherlands 1985-1990, 1993
Japan, US, Germany 1991-1992
Japan, US, India 1994
Madagascar France 1980-1982 1987-1994
France, US, Japan 1983-1984
France, US, Germany 1985-1986 1987-1992
France, Germany, Japan 1993-1994
Maldives Japan, Sri Lanka, Germany 1980
Singapore, Japan, Sri Lanka 1981-1983
Singapore, Japan, Thailand 1984-1985
Singapore, Thailand, Germany 1986-1987 1988
Singapore, Thailand, UK 1989
Singapore, UK, Sri Lanka 1990-199427
Malawi SDR 1980-1984
South Africa, UK, Germany 1985-1990
South Africa, US, Japan 1991
South Africa, Germany, Japan 1992-1993
South Africa, Zimbabwe, Japan 1994
Malaysia Japan, US, Singapore 1980-1993 1994
Malta UK, Germany, Italy 1980-1994
Mauritius SDR 1980-1983
UK, France, Germany 1984-1991
UK, France, South Africa 1992
UK, France, US 1993-1994
Mexico US 1983 1980-1982, 1984-1994
Morocco France, Spain, Germany 1980 1981-1982, 1985, 1987-1988,
1990
France, Spain, US 1993-1994 1983-1984, 1986, 1989
France, Spain, Italy 1991-1992
Mozambique Thailand, Italy, US 1986-1987
US 1988-1989
US, Thailand, Italy 1991
US, Portugal, Spain 1992
South Africa, Zimbabwe, Portugal 1993-1994
Nepal US 1980-1983
Hong Kong, Japan, Germany 1984-1985
Japan, Germany, Singapore 1986-1990
Germany, Japan, India 1991-1993
Germany, India, Thailand 1994
Nicaragua US 1980-1993 1994
Nigeria SDR 1980-1994
Pakistan US 1980-1982 1983-1994
Paraguay US 1980-1989 1990-1994
Peru US 1986-1990 1980-1985, 1991-1994
Philippines SDR 1980-1994
Saudi Arabia SDR 1980-1994
Singapore Malaysia, Japan, US 1980-1988 1989-1994
Japan, Australia, Singapore 1991-1994
South Africa SDR 1980-1994
Sri Lanka SDR 1980-1994
Swaziland South Africa 1980-1994
Syria US 1980-1994
Tanzania UK, Germany, Japan 1980-1993 1994
Thailand Japan, US, Singapore 1980-1981, 1985-1994 1982-1984
Trinidad and Tobago US 1980-1993 1994
Tunisia France, Italy, Germany 1980-1988 1989-1994
Turkey SDR 1980-1994
Uganda US 1988-1990




Japan, Italy, Spain 1989
Japan, Italy, Australia 1990-1994
Venezuela US 1980-1989 1990-1994
Zaire (Congo) SDR 1980-1983 1984-1994
Zambia SDR 1980-1983, 1990-1991
Japan, South Africa, Saudi Arabia 1984
Japan, UK, US 1985
US 1988-198928
Zimbabwe South Africa, UK, Germany 1981
South Africa, UK, US 1982-1983
UK, US, Germany 1984
UK, Germany, Italy 1985
South Africa, UK, Germany, US 1986-199429
Table A2: Original series used to construct the different variables
Abbreviation Description Unit Frequency Countries Source
PEGIMF Official pegging strategy Dummy Annual Home IMF
TARGET Actual or potential pegged-to-
currency
Dummy Annual Home IMF Trade Statistics
EXCH Monthly exchange rate Local currency per US$ Monthly Home &
Target
IFS cd-rom
AEXCH Annual exchange rate Local currency per US$ Annual Home &
Target
IFS cd-rom
CAPRES1-4 Dummies indicating capital controls Dummy Annual Home Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti





GDPNOM Nominal GDP Local currency Annual Home IFS cd-rom
DCPI Changes in Consumer Prices Percentage Annual Home &
Target
IFS cd-rom
TOR Central Bank Independence
(Turnover Rate)
No of change in governors Annual Home Own dataset
DEBT External debt US$ Annual Home World Bank
IMP Nominal imports Local currency Annual Home IFS cd-rom
EXP Nominal exports Local currency Annual Home IFS cd-rom
POP Population Number Annual Home IFS cd-rom
BMON Reserve/Base money (M0) Local currency Annual Home IFS cd-rom
RES International Reserves SDR Annual Home IFS cd-rom
SDRDOL Annual SDR Exchange Rate SDR per US$ Annual Home IFS cd-rom
ASSAS Assassinations Dummy Annual Home Clemens Siermann
STRIKE Strikes Dummy Annual Home Clemens Siermann
GUERIL Guerrilla Dummy Annual Home Clemens Siermann
CRGOV Crisis (government) Dummy Annual Home Clemens Siermann
PURGE Purge Dummy Annual Home Clemens Siermann
RIOTS Riots Dummy Annual Home Clemens Siermann
REVOL Revolutions Dummy Annual Home Clemens Siermann
DEMON Anti-government demonstrations Dummy Annual Home Clemens Siermann
BRIT Dummy for former British colonies Dummy Home Barro (1996) & The Political Reference Almanac
(http://www.polisci.com)
SAFRICA Dummy for sub-Saharan African
countries
Dummy Home Sala-i-Martin (1997) & The Political Reference Almanac
(http://www.polisci.com)30
Table A3: Constructed variables used in the empirical analysis
Abbreviation Description Underlying series
PEGSTD Standard deviation of percentage change in exchange rate EXCH, TARGET
VARGDPH Variance real GDP shocks home GDP
VARGDPT Variance real GDP shocks target TARGET, GDP, AEXCH
CORGDP Correlation real GDP shocks TARGET, GDP, AEXCH
VARDCPIH Variance inflation shocks home DCPI
VARDCPIT Variance inflation shocks target TARGET, DCPI
CORDCPI Correlation inflation shocks TARGET, DCPI
TORAVG Average turnover rate TOR
TOR5 5-years moving average turnover rate TOR
INSTAVG Average political instability measure ASSAS, CRGOV, DEMON, GUERIL, PURGE, REVOL, RIOTS,
STRIKE
INST5 5-years moving average political instability measure ASSAS, CRGOV, DEMON, GUERIL, PURGE, REVOL, RIOTS,
STRIKE
LPOPAVG Average log population POP
OPENAVG Average openness IMP, EXP, GDPNOM
OPEN51 Lagged 5-years moving average openness IMP, EXP, GDPNOM
GROWTH51 Lagged 5-years moving average real GDP growth rate GDP
GROWTH Real GDP growth rate GDP
DEBTGDP1 Lagged external debt as percentage of GDP DEBT, AEXCH, GDPNOM
DEBTGDP External debt as percentage of GDP DEBT, AEXCH, GDPNOM
RESMON51 Lagged 5-years moving average of international reserves as percentage of base money RES, SDRDOL, AEXCH, BMON
RESGDP51 Lagged 5-years moving average of international reserves as percentage of GDP RES, SDRDOL, AEXCH, GDPNOM31
Table A4: Summary statistics of variables used in the analysis
Series Obs Mean Std Error Minimum Maximum
PEGSTD 887 0.031 0.075 0.000 1.181
VARGDPH 887 0.260 0.212 0.026 1.212
VARGDPT 887 0.280 0.393 0.032 1.947
CORGDP 887 0.194 0.281 -0.764 0.908
VARDCPIH 862 0.007 0.015 0.000 0.131
VARDCPIT 862 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003
CORDCPI 859 0.295 0.461 -1.000 0.990
TORAVG 887 0.278 0.193 0.050 0.950
TOR5 879 0.286 0.270 0.000 1.600
INSTAVG 877 0.000 1.951 -2.101 6.996
INST5 869 0.000 1.697 -1.355 8.898
LPOPAVG 887 2.763 0.115 2.460 3.015
OPENAVG 857 0.635 0.380 0.145 2.034
OPEN51 855 0.634 0.396 0.122 2.201
GROWTH51 867 0.036 0.034 -0.087 0.148
GROWTH 882 0.033 0.050 -0.254 0.252
DEBTGDP1 716 0.644 0.742 0.015 9.605
DEBTGDP 763 0.653 0.753 0.015 9.605
RESMON51 770 0.773 1.134 0.011 12.310
RESGDP51 828 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.012
PEGIMF 887 0.534 0.499 0.000 1.000
BRIT 887 0.450 0.498 0.000 1.000
SAFRICA 887 0.258 0.438 0.000 1.000